SKU: 83259
741st Military Intelligence Battalion Unit Crest (Primoris Scio)
$ 17.59
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United States Army 741st Military Intelligence Battalion Unit Crest (Primoris Scio)
Criteria: These distinctive unit insignia (DUI) are worn by the 741st Military Intelligence Battalion (741st MI BN). Their motto Primoris Scio means First to Know and is inscribed on each crest. Approved for wear in 2006. Unit crests are worn on the Army Class A Uniform (Greens) and Army Service Uniform.
Note: Sold in pairs (i.e., if you order a quantity of 1 you will receive two Unit Crests).
SKU: 83259
741st Military Intelligence Battalion Unit Crest (Primoris Scio)
$17.59
United States Army 741st Military Intelligence Battalion Unit Crest (Primoris Scio)
Criteria: Unit Crests are unique to each unit in the U.S. Army and are officially known as Distinctive Unit Insignia - although most Soldiers refer to them as 'Unit Crests.' The insignia design is derived from the coat of arms authorized for a unit. All personnel assigned to the organization wear the insignia, except general officers, the Sergeant Major of the Army and the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman. Enlisted personnel wear the unit crests on the green service uniform coat, centered on the shoulder loops equidistant from the outside shoulder seam to the outside edge of the button, with the base of the insignia toward the outside shoulder seam. Enlisted personnel are not authorized to wear the unit crest on the Class A uniform. Officers wear the unit crest centered on the shoulder loops, equidistant from the inside edge of their grade insignia to the outside edge of the button, with the base of the insignia toward the outside shoulder seam.
Note: Sold in pairs (i.e., if you order a quantity of 1 you will receive two Unit Crests).
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312th Military Intelligence Battalion
Organizational Legacy
'Always The Truth'
'The Military Intelligence March' |
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Reconnaissance Satellite Gathers Military Intelligence |
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Battalion Distinctive Unit Insignia
Introduction
The 1st Cavalry Division, a major subordinate command of the US Third MobileArmored Corps, is a 19,000 soldier, heavy armored division stationed at Ft. Hood, TX. As one of the two 'on-call' heavy contingency force divisions of theArmy, the First Team has an on-order mission to deploy by sea, air or land toany part of the world on a short notice. The following narratives, divided intimeline eras of major operational missions, describes the threat environment,tactical conditions, evolution of equipment technology and the strategicmethodology employed by one of the subnorate units of the Separate Battalionsand Companies Command, the 312th Military Intelligence Battalion whoseaccomplishments and the honors they achieved are summarized in the sectionsthat follow. On 31 December 1943; the 23rd Signal Construction Battalion (a parentorganization of the 312th Military Intelligence Battalion) was constitutedin the Regular Army and on 10 Feburary 1944, activated at Camp Pickett,Virginia.
It was not until 01 October 1981; that the 312th Army Security Agency -redesignated as the 312th Military Intelligence Battalion, assigned to the 1stCavalry Division, and activated at Fort Hood, Texas. ('A' and 'B' Companieswere concurrently consolidated with the 371st Army Security Agency [SeeANNEX - 1] and the 191st Military Intelligence Company [See ANNEX 2]. Theconsolidated units were designated as 'A' and 'B' Companies, 312th MilitaryIntelligence Battalion.)
Following a long series of assignments, as described in the sections thstfollow - the 312th Military Intelligence Battalion was inactivated on 15October, 2005 at Fort Hood, TX. and relieved from assignment to the 1stCavalry Division. This inactivation was in par, due to the transformation ofthe 1st Cavalry Division to the US Army's modular force structure. As a partof the transformation, assets previously held at division level, buthabitually assigned to brigades were made organic to those brigades. Militaryintelligence elements were integrated into the special troops battalions ofthe modular Brigade combat teams. 'B' Company was reflagged as 'A' Company,Special Troops Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division.
Mission:
The primary mission of the 312 Military Intelligence Battalion is to providetimely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized intelligence and electronicwarfare support to tactical, operational and strategic-level commanders ofthe 1st Cavalry Division. The intelligencee components of the Battalionproduce intelligence for Divisional use and for sharing across the nationaland specified international intelligence communities.
Primary elements of the mission are:
- Support the Brigade and above commander's needs and requests.
- Encourage esprit de corps.
- Broaden education and professionalism.
- Preserve our past and link'lessons learned' to the future.
- Suppport the Division and MI Corps Museum.
- Provide a medium that encourges ideas and growth.
- Become leaders in information operations.
- Educate the rest of the Army about MI and the MI profession.
These eight functions of the Military Intelligence the commanders with thenecessary information and support for the successful completion of many Armymissions.
Organizational Summary:
Military Intelligence, the collection of information by commanders on theenemy and the battlefield environment they must confront, has existed sincethe beginnings of armies and of wars. However, the emergence of professionalilitary Intelligence organizations and the definition of the functions theymost appropriately performed are comparatively recent developments. Until thenineteenth century, Military Intelligence was practiced only in wartime;methods of collection were rudimentary; and the conduct of Militaryintelligence was considered a function of command, one which any professionalofficer could perform. Furthermore, commanders tended to be skeptical aboutthe reliability of the information they received from spies, scouts, and theirown troops.
World War-I exposed the Army to a dazzling new array of technologicalenhancements to the collection process: aerial photography and reconnaissance,radio intercept, and optical and acoustical sensors used to detect aircraftand artillery. One secondary effect was that much of the Army's practicalintelligence work was carried out by nonintelligence personnel: the interceptpersonnel of the Signal Corps; technicians manning artillery targetingdevices; topographic specialists in the Corps of Engineers; and aviators. Thissituation in turn tended to block or delay the further centralization of theintelligence function.
In the long years of peace following the Armistice, Army Intelligencecontinued to search for an appropriate place within an Army the size of whichhad again been greatly reduced. A basic problem of Army Intelligence remainedconceptual: defining what an intelligence organization should do. ArmyIntelligence offices, in fact, continued to be regarded as clearing houses forall manner of information functions unrelated to intelligence. During theinterwar years, for example, intelligence staffs managed the Army's publicaffairs programs; later they were tasked with conducting psychological warfareand writing the history of the Army. It took a surprisingly long time, untilthe end of World War-II, for Army Intelligence to concentrate on its primarytask, 'knowing one's enemies.
In World War II these attitudes began to change. Military and politicalleaders alike recognized that intelligence was crucial to military success. Tomeet its information needs, the Army was forced to create a large intelligencestructure, manned largely by draftees and officers commissioned into theReserves. Acting through its wartime operating arm, the Military IntelligenceService, the Military Intelligence Division instituted formal training forintelligence personnel in a diversity of disciplines. By the end of the warvarious types of intelligence teams and counterintelligence detachments weresupporting the intelligence staffs of all tactical units in the field.
When the Army entered World War-II, it envisaged only two types of tacticalsignal intelligence units: radio intelligence platoons organic to thedivisional signal companies and signal radio intelligence (SRI) companiesassigned to field armies on a basis of one per army The signal radiointelligence companies were quite sizable units, each with an assignedstrength of slightly over 300 officers and men, internally divided into aheadquarters platoon, an intercept platoon, a direction-finding platoon, anda wire platoon for communications. Neither of the two types had anyanalytical personnel. Analysis and translation were to be accomplishedcentrally by small radio intelligence staff elements at the theater and fieldarmy levels, as had been the case in World War-I. These elements now reportedto the chief signal officer,
From the intelligence perspective, the war in Europe was characterized by thegradual evolution of independent theater-level signal intelligence services,Military Intelligence services, and the institution of centralized control atthe theater level over Army counterintelligence specialists. Thesedevelopments took place at first in the Mediterranean and then in the EuropeanTheater of Operations.
In rhe Pacific, in the spring of 1942, MacArthur set up a centralizedcryptologic agency Central Bureau, Brisbane (CBB). Headed by MacArthur'schief signal officer, a former chief of the Signal Intelligence Service, CBBwas jointly manned by personnel of the US Army and the Royal Australian Armyand Air Force. The American component consisted at first of two officers anda few intercept operators drawn from a detachment of the 2nd Signal ServiceCompany on Corregidor, later reinforced by a signal service detachment.
Thus, from the beginning Army Intelligence personnel in the Pacific were partof a high-level processing center that eventually broke Japanese militarycodes and thus generated ULTRA. Despite its name, CBB was not a staticorganization; an advance echelon of the Central Bureau accompanied the GeneralHeadquarters of MacArthur in successive forward deployments, and by July 1945,almost the whole organization had been moved to San Miguel on the Philippineisland of Luzon. By the end of the war, the Central Bureau staffed to a levelof 1,500 had acquired batteries of IBM machines, and was directing thecollection efforts of four American signal radio intelligence companies andsome ten equivalent British Commonwealth units.
Meanwhile, the Signal Corps conducted its own intelligence and security war,entering the field of radar, which was at once a collection technology, a newintelligence target, and a subject of possible countermeasures. Moreimportant, the Signal Corps provided cryptologic support to the War Departmentthrough its Signal Security Agency and furnished theater commanders withtactical signals intelligence units. The growing importance of communicationsintelligence ultimately resulted in the transfer of responsibility for thefunction from the Signal Corps to Military Intelligence. The Army emerged fromWorld War II with an intelligence structure that in some ways prefigured thatof the present.
The Korean War revitalized the Army Security Agency, which found a new rolein providing support to tactical operations. During the course of the war, theagency reorganized and redesignated its existing signal service companies ascommunication reconnaissance companies and activated new communicationreconnaissance companies, battalions, and groups to support tacticalcommanders at every level. The new concept placed a communicationreconnaissance group in support of the field army. The group would commandsubordinate ASA units and had the mission of dispatching liaison teams to thecombat divisions. At the corps level, flexibly organized communicationreconnaissance battalions directed the activities of separate numberedcompanies.
By the mid 1050', the Intelligence Division's most important asset wasprovided by the newly formed Army Security Agency (ASA). In many ways the ArmySecurity Agency was unique. A large portion of the headquarters continued tobe staffed by civilian experts, and the agency's organizational pattern hadno parallel in the rest of the Army. The Army Security Agency was put togetheron the 'stovepipe' principle, and Arlington Hall controlled the activities ofall units through a separate ASA chain of command. This distinctive verticalcommand structure, which provided centralized control over all Army signalsintelligence and communications security assets, set ASA apart, as did thehigh walls of compartmented secrecy surrounding its sensitive operations. Allthat most members of the Army knew about the Army Security Agency was thatthey were not supposed to know anything about it.
The 1960's began with brave promises; however, events soon began to go awry.Although successive crises with the Soviet Union over Berlin and the Sovietdeployment of missiles to Cuba were resolved peaceably, the Viet Conginsurgency in South Vietnam continued to fester, despite the involvement of anincreasing number of American military advisers. In early November 1963, abeleaguered President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam was assassinated during acoup by his own Army. Intended to stabilize the deteriorating securitysituation in South Vietnam by removing an unpopular leader, the coup had theopposite effect. As a revolving-door series of ephemeral governments came andwent in Saigon, Communists gained an increasing foothold in the countryside.Meanwhile, President John Kennedy had been assassinated in Dallas; hissuccessor, Lyndon Johnson, had a wealth of experience in domestic politicsbut no substantive understanding of foreign affairs. Johnson won election in1964 on a platform of peace and social reform, but soon found thatdevelopments in Vietnam would imperil both goals.
By early 1965 a Viet Cong victory seemed imminent. America responded initiallywith limited air raids against the Viet Cong's sponsor, North Vietnam. Whenthis action proved unproductive, ground troops were committed to the Southunder the direction of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), ajoint, Army-dominated 'sub-theater' headquarters. The North Vietnamesecountered by steadily increasing their war buildup, sending in their ownregular forces to supplement the activities of the guerrillas.
Thus the United States lurched into an undeclared war. On the American side,this remained a limited effort. The focus of President Johnson on constructinga 'Great Society' at home, and he regarded the war in Southeast Asia as anunpleasant distraction. As a matter of deliberate management, the conflict wasfought without passion, without censorship, without mobilization, and withoutraising taxes. Increasingly, it was fought without popular enthusiasm. On theother hand, for the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong proxies, the war wastotal. By the end of 1967 an American Army of 485,000 soldiers and marines, backedup by an enormous logistical system, had deployed in country; and officialstalked brightly that there was now 'light at the end of the tunnel.' The Tetoffensive at the beginning of 1968 dispelled this dream, however. It broke thewill of an administration and shattered the confidence of the American people.After Tet, all roads ran downhill. The Johnson administration decided to stopreinforcing the war effort; its successor chose to withdraw gradually from thewar and return the tar baby to the luckless South Vietnamese. In the meantime,the United States was unraveling on the domestic front. Racial unrest resultedin rioting on a massive scale, while an increasingly violent antiwar movementgrew in strength on the nation's campuses.
All of these events had a massive impact on Military Intelligence. Somestructural changes that took place during this period were driven by newdevelopments in technology. Most, however, were brought about by the militarycommitment to Southeast Asia and its manifold repercussions. The Vietnamconflict, its domestic side effects, and the economic and psychologicalconstraints produced by the outcome of the venture all worked to reshape theorganization of Army Intelligence.
In January 1977, the Army formed the new major command,by redesignating theUS Army Security Agency as Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Inaddition, the Army reassigned the US Army Intelligence Agency, as well asACSI's and FORSCOM'S intelligence production units, to the new command. At thesame time, control of ASA's tactical units reverted to the supportedcommanders. The training, personnel, research and development, and materielacquisition and administration functions which the Army Security Agency hadcarried out were assumed by other major commands and by elements of the ArmyStaff. INSCOM also assumed command of three Military Intelligence Groupslocated overseas: the 66th in Germany, the 470th in Panama and the 500th inJapan. Previously, these units had been assigned respectively to USAREUR andSeventh Army FORSCOM, and the US Army Intelligence Agency.
The formastion of INSCOM in 1977, provided the Army with a single instrumentto conduct of the Army multidiscipline intelligence and security operationsand electronic warfare at the level above corps and to produce finishedintelligence tailored to the needs of the Army. The new major command mergeddivergent intelligence disciplines and traditions in a novel way. Its creationmarked the most radical realignment of Army Intelligence assets in ageneration. Without fully realizing it, the Army had achieved not a ,'multidiscipline' organization, but an interdisciplinary approach tointelligence collection. The new command provided Army Intelligence with aframework within which the individual intelligence disciplines could cross-cueone another; the results of this collective effort would be greater than thesum of its parts.
The 1980s were prosperous years for the Army, especially for its restructuredintelligence component. The formation of INSCOM and the implementation of theCommunications Electronics Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) concept not onlyaffected intelligence operations throughout the Army, but also drew theMilitary Intelligence Branch firmly into the mainstream of the service. Forthe first time, most MI personnel were assigned to TOE units. By 1988, fiveMI brigades and no less than thirty MI battalions had been formed under theCEWI concept to support tactical units in the field, while another five TOEMI brigades and ten TOE single-function battalions carried out theater - andnational-level support missions under INSCOM.
However, just as the Soviet threat receded and pundits began to talk aboutthe pleasant possibilities of a 'peace dividend,' a new array of internationalchallenges appeared. In December 1989, American forces stormed Panama inOperation JUST CAUSE, overthrowing the regime of its narcotics-linkedstrong-man, General Manuel Noriega. Eight months later, crisis flared in theMiddle East. An Iraqi invasion of the tiny emirate of Kuwait, threatening boththe oil supply of the world and the stability of a potential new world order,led to a massive American response. The United States deployed over 500,000men and women to the Persian Gulf region, the largest buildup of troopssince Vietnam, and then committed them to battle in Operation DESERT STORM, alightning air and ground war that resulted in complete victory.
Despite these conflicting crosscurrents of events, planning for retrenchmentof the force continued. Nevertheless, it was clear that the post-Cold Warworld would continue to hold unforeseen and unforeseeable perils. In theunstructured international environment created by the sudden collapse of thebipolar world order imposed by the Cold War, crises could, and didtake placein almost any region of the globe. The prospect of a smaller Army and a morediffused but wider menace would inevitably affect the institutionalarrangements of Military Intelligence, since intelligence organizations arenecessarily shaped by the threat as well as the force structure in place. Inaddition to preparing for contingency operations, Army Intelligence now had tomonitor arms verification agreements, fight terrorism, maintain a vigilantwatch against espionage, and assume a counter-drug mission in support ofcivilian authorities.
The challenges of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, successive crises occurringhalf a world apart and in totally unrelated linguistic environments - hadalready made large demands on Military Intelligence and appeared to serve as aportent for the future. On the whole, the Army had met these demandssuccessfully. INSCOM's 470th Military Intelligence Brigade and its attached29th Military Intelligence Battalion had been in place in Panama when thatcrisis broke. INSCOM's 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, with along-standing contingency mission to support the US Army Central Command, hadbeen at least partially positioned to meet Army intelligence requirements whendeployment to the Persian Gulf began.
Recently, the chief of Military Intelligence declared, 'Army Intelligence hastruly arrived,' and in one sense he was correct. In another sense, however,Military Intelligence was still in transit, progressively redefining itself asthe Army, the nation, and the international situation changed. Still, whereverthe journey might lead it in the future, clearly Military Intelligence hascome a long way from its modest beginning in 1885 as the Division of MilitaryInformation.
This folio of material highlights of the many subsequent historical criticalmissions performed by members of the 312 Military Intelligence Battalion,whose actions, operations and the many critical issues resolved over its 69+years history to meet the changing threat and the honors they achieved aresummarized in the following sections:
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Copyright © 1996, Cavalry Outpost Publications ® andTrooper Wm. H. Boudreau, 'F' Troop, 8th Cavalry Regiment (1946 - 1947). Allrights to this body of work are reserved and are not in the public domain, oras noted in the bibliography. Reproduction, or transfer by electronic means,of the History of the 1st Cavalry Division, the subordinate units or anyinternal element, is not permitted without prior authorization. Readers areencouraged to link to any of the pages of this Web site, provided that properacknowledgment attributing to the source of the data is made. The informationor content of the material contained herein is subject to change withoutnotice.Return to 'MyOwnPages'©.
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